# TAX IMPLICATIONS OF LITIGATION

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1 INTRODUCTION

At the heart of most litigation is the enforcement of rights or the receipt of relief for loss suffered. The receipt and payment of damages, and of sums paid by way of settlement or compromise may be taken into account in the assessment of income tax, including capital gains tax (CGT), and may attract other taxes such as State duties or GST. In such cases, the incidence of taxation may have to be taken into account in quantifying the damages or settlement in order to give a true reflex of the amount of the loss. Even if the incidence of tax does not affect the quantum of the damages or settlement, your client may get an unpleasant surprise or be ignorant of his taxation rights and obligations unless he or she is forewarned.

There are provisions in the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (ITAA97) and the 1936 Act of the same name (ITAA36) dealing with the taxation of damages or compensation in particular circumstances. These have a comparatively limited application. There are also more general provisions. For example, receipts of damages and compensation may be assessable as ordinary income under Div 6 of the ITAA 97 or as statutory income such as net capital gains under Chpt3 of the ITAA97 (CGT), or such as receipts caught by s15-30 of the ITAA97 (insurance or indemnity for loss of assessable income), or such as assessable recoupments under Subdiv 20-A of Pt 2-1 of the ITAA97.

In each case, it is necessary to consider what, if any exemption or concession may apply, and where a receipt may be assessable under more than one provision, the relevance of any anti-overlap provisions.

Payments of compensation may be deductible under Div8 (deductions) or s40-880 (capital expenditure) of the ITAA97, or under some provision having a more limited application, or they may form the cost base or part of the cost base of a CGT asset.

Thus, the incidence and amount of tax often differs depending on which legislative provisions apply.

In this paper, I am concentrating on CGT.

I would say that in all disputes and litigation, it would be wise to at least consider the implications of taxation at each critical stage; that is, when negotiating, when framing a claim or demand, when pleading the case, when running the case, when settling, and when gaining relief. The incidence of taxation (if any) will depend on the characterisation of the relief or payment under taxation legislation and perhaps rulings, and this in turn may affect the quantum of money necessary to afford proper compensation.

2 DRAWING CLAIMS, SETTLEMENTS, INDEMNITIES, ETC

Hence the way in which you formulate your claim and the terms of any settlement, in addition to other circumstances, may affect the characterization and hence the incidence of tax. As others have pointed out, an understanding of the tax treatment of a compensation payment will be important if there is any element of choice involved in how the payment is to be made.

A party’s opinion as to the possible incidence of tax may affect the amount for which a party is prepared to settle. If a party overlooks the issue, he or she risks receiving too little or paying too much, that is, over compensating the plaintiff or being under compensated.

Careful and considered analysis and communication are therefore called for, in cases where a characterisation one way or another will affect the incidence of tax.

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1 Eg, ITAA36, s26AG(4); ITAA97, s15-25, 70-55, Subdiv20-A of Chpt2.
2 This is not an exhaustive list or anything like it of statutory income.
3 For the most part, where provisions in the ITAA97 correspond with provisions in the ITAA36, I shall refer only to those in the ITAA97.
4 For example, there are exemptions applying to CGT in Div 118 (see especially, s118-37) and in Pt 3-3 of the ITAA97.
5 Eg, ITAA97, ss25-15 and 25-50.
Subject to anti-avoidance rules such as Pt IVA of the ITAA36, as a general rule, it is preferable to apportion identifiable amounts to items which qualify for exemption or concessional treatment. As we shall see, there are several such items in the CGT regime.

One can provide for a multitude of uncertainties by drafting ever more elaborate clauses. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that any compromise, like many an award of damages, is likely to be no more than an approximation. Moreover, usually, the plaintiff does not get full compensation from a compromise. Hence, the approach to making taxation adjustments in awards of damages may not always be appropriate in negotiations for a compromise. There is always a risk that haggling over details will cause negotiations to break down, or prevent the reaching of a binding agreement that in hindsight the haggler would like to be able to enforce. There is also sometimes a virtue in simplicity. It most cases it is best to allow common sense to prevail.

The matter can be summed up thus:7

On many occasions there will be little doubt into which category [taxable or non-taxable] the payment will fall. On some occasions, however, the position may not be as clear and it will then behove the lawyer advising the defendant to consider the possible implication of compensation paid pursuant to a negotiated settlement in which case there may be an opportunity to mould the basis on which the payment of compensation is made rather than to simply submit to a judgment.

3 RUNNING CASES WHERE TAXATION ADJUSTMENT AN ISSUE

3.1 Evidence

Although at least one case8 suggests that, in order to recover additional damages for CGT, the plaintiff must prove that it is more likely than not that the plaintiff’s loss and damage will include a liability to CGT, the better view9 (in the opinion of the writer) is that the plaintiff has to prove on the balance of probabilities that there is a more than fanciful risk that his loss and damage will include such liability. As to whether the plaintiff must go further and adduce evidence that enables the court to make a realistic assessment of the extent of the risk and range of amounts involved, there is a conflict amongst the relevant authorities.10

Because CGT is imposed on net capital gains, the plaintiff’s capital losses, net capital losses, and capital gains – past, present and future – may affect the assessment of damages and hence be relevant. Likewise, evidence of the plaintiff’s income, profits, losses, and outgoings, may be relevant. For example, the defendant may wish to adduce evidence of the plaintiff’s capital losses in order to prove that there is no real risk that the award of damages will increase the plaintiff’s taxable income in any year.

Similar principles apply where other provisions for the assessment of income tax, or the incidence of other taxes may affect the quantum of damages.11

It will be advisable for a litigant wishing to gain a tax adjustment in its favour to obtain the expert opinion of a tax practitioner.12 To the extent that such an opinion were an opinion on matters of law rather than practice, it could be adopted as a submission of the litigant if not admitted as evidence. There is, however, authority that it could be admitted as evidence.13 In addition, rulings could be tendered, and other evidence from the Australian Tax Office could be adduced. The Commissioner can be bound by favourable private rulings.14 Otherwise, the ruling is mere evidence, which the court can reject, as it did in the Carborundum case.15

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8 Tuite v Exelby 93 ATC 4293, 4303.
10 In the Duke Group case, supra the plaintiff did not need to go further, but in Osric Investments Pty Ltd v Woburn [2001] FCA 1402, the Court rejected that approach. See also the Carborundum case, supra.
11 See cases referred to above in section on relevance of taxation to the assessment of damages.
12 See the Osric case, supra and Namol’s case, supra.
13 See Namol Pty Ltd v AW Boulderstone Pty Ltd 93 ATC 101 and see Slater QC and Durack SC, ‘Taxation of Judgments, Awards and Settlements’, NSW Bar Assoc, CLE Program, 9 October, 1995. See also the various Evidence Acts of the States and the C’th.
14 See Taxation Administration Act 1993, Sch1, Pt5-5, especially s357-60.
15 Supra. On the advantages and disadvantages for each party of seeking a private ruling or relying on one in a suit for damages, see Slater QC and Durack SC, ‘Taxation of Judgments, Awards and Settlements’, NSW Bar Assoc, CLE Program, 9 October, 1995.
In proceedings for the recovery of damages, it may be prudent for the plaintiff to seek orders for confidentiality, especially so as to protect the confidentiality of communications that could be privileged from production in proceedings with the Commissioner.

3.2 Remedy or relief

Where a litigant proves that there is a real risk that tax will have an impact on damages, there is controversy as to what relief is meet. Because of the system of self-assessment applying to taxpayers, a plaintiff’s liability to tax may take years to be fixed with finality. This is so even if the plaintiff agrees with the defendant to conditions, or obligations are imposed on the plaintiff by the court assessing damages, in either case requiring the plaintiff to expose the issues to the Commissioner in such a way as enable the plaintiff to contest an adverse assessment.

Having regard to these difficulties, in some of cases in which damages have been awarded which might attract CGT, the court has granted one of the parties an indemnity, or reserved liberty to apply. Arguably, however, the grant of such relief offends against the principle that damages are to be granted once and for all. Nevertheless, where a plaintiff seeks an increase in damages owing to a tax adjustment, the plaintiff would be wise to apply for an indemnity as well. Furthermore, it may be prudent for the party granted any such relief (whether plaintiff or defendant) to apply for security.

3.3 Joinder of Commissioner

In the Carborundum case, the Court commented that the Commissioner had not been joined as a party to the litigation in which damages were claimed, so of course he was not bound by the result. There is authority that the Commissioner cannot be joined as a party merely on the grounds that some tax adjustment to damages is in issue, because he has no real interest in the outcome. This can lead to uncertainty and the risk of unfairness, eg, should the predictions of the court assessing damages turn out to be wrong. In some cases, it may be possible to overcome the problem by approaching the Commissioner for agreement to be bound by the result in the case, and by offering him as a condition of his agreeing to do so, the opportunity of making submissions as amicus curiae. Another option is to seek a private ruling.

In some cases, where the Commissioner has a real interest in the litigation, such as where the refunding of amounts paid to him is in issue, he may be a proper party and the court may make a declaration against him, although there are specific statutory provisions dealing with that type of case.

I now turn to more detailed technical matters.

4 THE RELEVANCE OF TAXATION (INCLUDING CGT) TO THE ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES

The following rules appear to apply.

16 A very useful discussion of the difficulties associated with this and of some possible solutions, is to be found in Slater QC and Durack SC, ‘Taxation of Judgments, Awards and Settlements’, NSW Bar Assoc, CLE Program, 9 October, 1995.
17 According to TR 95/35 and TR 94/29, the plaintiff may be required to amend an earlier return on the receipt of damages or interest.
18 One option for the plaintiff may be to include the income in his return, and if the return constitutes the assessment, or he receives a notice of assessment, object to it under the relevant statutory provisions in the Taxation Administration Act 1993.
19 As in Provan’s case and Duke’s case, both supra. But an indemnity was refused in the Carborundum case, supra and in Namol’s case, supra.
20 As in Rabelais Pty Ltd v Cameron 95 ATC 4552 and Turner’s case, supra. Another possibility is for the court to grant a stay or to require an undertaking.
21 Supra.
23 See Oil Basins Ltd v C’th 93 ATC 4947.
24 See, eg, TAA, Sch1, Subdiv18-B.
Rule 1: Where taking into account the award of damages or compensation, the defendant's wrongful conduct does not affect, ie, increase, reduce, hasten or delay the incidence of tax borne by the plaintiff, the taxation of damages is irrelevant to the assessment of damages.\textsuperscript{27} Thus, no adjustment to the amount of compensation or damages because of a potential liability tax (‘taxation adjustment’) is called for where neither the damages nor what is being compensated for would be assessable (or taxable), or where a statutory right to compensation is to a net after tax amount.\textsuperscript{28}

Rule 2: Where the defendant’s wrongful conduct does have such an effect (ie, it alters the incidence of tax), subject to considerations of remoteness, the altered incidence of taxation is relevant to the assessment of damages.\textsuperscript{29} Its incidence may provide an additional head of loss.\textsuperscript{30} Or its incidence may furnish a ground of reduction, because the lost income would have been taxed but the damages will not be.\textsuperscript{31} This principle is sometimes referred to as the ‘Gourley’ principle\textsuperscript{32} and has a number of results. For example, where an award of damages includes compensation for loss of income which would have been taxable, and the damages are not taxable, the damages must be computed by reference to the net loss of income after allowing for the tax which would have been paid.\textsuperscript{33} Thus in \textit{Cullen v Trappell}, the incidence of income tax on the income that the plaintiff would have earned (but for the defendant’s wrongful act) was relevant to the assessment of damages for loss of earning capacity and had the effect of reducing those damages. This was so, even though what was being compensated for was not, in strictness, the loss of income, but rather, the loss of capacity to earn income. Again, it has been said that there is a case for saying that an award should be loaded to cover the excess tax resulting from the money being paid in one taxation year instead of being spread over the period of the loss.\textsuperscript{34}

Rule 3: In order to determine whether or not the defendant’s conduct does have an effect on the plaintiff’s liability to tax, it is necessary to work out what tax the plaintiff would have paid but for the defendant’s conduct, and what tax the plaintiff will pay on the damages. Because of the complexity of taxation provisions and the way in which they operate, this can be difficult.

A further difficulty is lack of certainty about the course of future events. In assessing compensation, questions may arise, for example of the likelihood of a plaintiff company’s going into liquidation some time in the future, of its making losses, or of possible changes in rates of tax, or – rare as it is – the abolition of a tax.\textsuperscript{35} In many cases, it is difficult to say what the incidence of taxation would have been if the occasion for the plaintiff’s claim had not happened.

One possible solution to such difficulties is to say that the onus of proof of loss whether past, present or prospective, being on the plaintiff, anything he does not prove as being highly is to be disregarded as being too speculative. Such a rule could, however, operate unfairly. Another solution, is to say that the plaintiff need not prove that something is more likely than not to happen, but only that there is a possibility of its happening, and to prove that possibility with the requisite degree of certainty. Damages are then reduced so as to reflect the degree of the possibility. There is some support for both approaches.\textsuperscript{36}

In many instances, the principles regarding the recoverability of damages, for example, in the case of contracts and torts, the rules as to remoteness, provide some certainty.\textsuperscript{37} Perhaps the best that can be done is to aim at some rough approximation to fairness.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{27} See, eg, \textit{Spencer v Macmillans Trustees} [1959] SLT 41.  
\textsuperscript{28} See, for example, \textit{Accident Compensation Act} 1985 (Vic), ss134AB (1), (14), (32) and (34) and 135C(3).  
\textsuperscript{29} See, eg, \textit{Saul v Menon} [1980] 2 NSWLR 314.  
\textsuperscript{31} See \textit{Cullen v Trappell}, supra. In Victoria, the rule is now enshrined by statute in cases where damages are claimed for deprivation or impairment of earning capacity, see s28A, \textit{Wrongs Act} 1958 (Vic), and generally on personal injury damages, see PtVB thereof.  
\textsuperscript{32} So named after the seminal case, \textit{British Transport Commission v Gourley} [1956] AC 185.  
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{35} See \textit{Lonie v Peruginin & Perugini} 77 ATC 4318, 4324.  
\textsuperscript{36} It has been held that possible changes in rates of tax are to be ignored if purely speculative; see \textit{British Transport Commission v Gourley} [1956] AC 185, 209; \textit{Whiiteman and Wheatcroft on Income Tax and Surtax} (1971) [20-15.]  
\textsuperscript{37} See section on running cases below, and \textit{Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd} (1991) 174 CLR 64.  
\textsuperscript{38} See, for example, \textit{Pennant Hills Restaurants v Barrett Insurances} 78 ATC at 4036f; \textit{Williamson v Cmr for Rlwys} (1959) 76 WN(NSW) 648.  
\textsuperscript{39} See \textit{Barrell Insurances v Pennant Hills Restaurants} (1979) 145 CLR 625; \textit{Gill v Australian Wheat Board} [1980] 2 NSWLR 355. In this case, Rogers J held that the whole essence of the decision in \textit{Cullen v Trappell} (1980) 146 CLR 1 is that the reality of the impact
I now turn to one of the factors in the equation for making tax adjustments: the question of how receipts of damages or compensation fall to be assessed.

5 TAXATION OF DAMAGES OR COMPENSATION UNDER INCOME TAX LAWS

5.1 Practical consequences of characterisation of receipt as ordinary income or as capital gain

There are certain concessions and advantages pertaining to the characterization of amounts as capital gains rather than as ordinary income. For example, where the taxpayer is an individual, trustee, or the trustee of a superannuation fund, or small business active assets are involved, the capital gain remaining after the application of any capital losses and net capital losses from previous income years is reduced by a substantial discount (50% in the case of individuals) when working out net capital gains. In effect this can substantially reduce the rate of tax. Alternatively, if a CGT asset was acquired on or before 21 September, 1999, indexation of its cost base may be available. In either case, to get the discount or indexation, the entity making the gain must have acquired the asset at least a year before the CGT event causing the gain.

Capital losses worked out for CGT events and net capital losses can be deducted only from capital gains, not assessable income. But business capital expenditure not otherwise taken into account may be deductible under the black hole expenditure provisions.

5.2 Income or capital receipt?

Under the anti-overlap provisions in the CGT legislation, capital gains are reduced if an amount is otherwise assessable, such as under Div 6 of the ITAA97 as ordinary income. Because of the different methods of taxation pertaining to capital gains and ordinary income, it is therefore important to determine whether an amount such as damages is ordinary income or capital.

How do you tell whether damages are to be categorized as ordinary income or as capital gains? The answer depends on the character of the receipt in the hands of the plaintiff. In general, one asks, For what were the damages paid? Were they paid for something on capital account, or for something pertaining to income, eg, loss of profits or lost wages? If the damages were paid for something pertaining to income according to ordinary concepts, s6-5 of the ITAA97 will apply. In some cases, the principle is overridden by other considerations. For example, the damages or compensation may arguably constitute income because it is received in a series of recurrent, periodic payments that do not constitute instalments of a lump sum. (Indeed, the damages or compensation may be received in such form that the provisions regarding royalties and annuities apply.) Compensation for loss of earning capacity (an affair of capital) may be income if the payment is periodic and is intended to be a supplement to the payee's income. A policy of insurance against impairment of the fruit bearing capacity of a tree may well take the form of providing fruit (income) till the tree recovers its proper role. If so, that fruit (compensation under the policy) will be income.
The fact that the amount of damages or compensation is payable in a lump sum is usually not a decisive factor in favour of its being capital, but is not wholly without relevance. In summary of the foregoing: in determining whether the receipt will be ordinary income or not, you must always ask the question what is it for, is it a substitute for income or capital? If it is for income, it generally is ordinary income, and if for capital, in general it is capital. Having answered that question, you must ask whether there are any distinguishing characteristics, such as periodicity, regularity, or recurrence, which make the damages or compensation income or capital notwithstanding.

One determines the question for what the damages were paid by having regard to the matrix of relevant facts. In most civil litigation, those facts will appear from the determination of the Tribunal (and if necessary its reasons). It may also be necessary and relevant to look at the pleadings (if they truly delineate the issues) to see what the plaintiff was claiming damages for, the evidence, and any agreements between the parties relevant to the conduct or settlement of the litigation. From this matrix of facts, one has to identify for what the damages were paid and then to categorize the damages as ordinary income, capital, or as falling within some other item of or exemption from assessable income.

The way in which you formulate your claim and the terms of any settlement, in addition to other circumstances such as the conduct of negotiations (eg, the content of a letter of demand), may affect the characterization of a receipt of damages or compensation as ordinary income or as one of the various types of statutory income, such as net capital gains. As we have seen, this in turn may affect the incidence of tax. Careful and considered analysis and drafting are therefore called for, in cases where a characterization one way or another will affect the outcome.

The circumstances in which damages or compensation are properly categorized as being income or capital are almost as multifarious as the circumstances in which any kind of receipt can be categorized as income or capital, and it would be beyond the scope of this paper, assuming it were possible, to attempt an exhaustive catalogue of such circumstances.

### 5.3 Apportionment of receipts

Another principle of importance, is that in a proper case, a single receipt of a mixed capital and income nature may be apportioned between capital and ordinary income respectively. Such a receipt cannot, however, be thus apportioned, where the payment is in respect of a claim or claims for unliquidated damages only and is made under a compromise which treats it as a single, undissected amount of damages. This principle has been much criticised by many commentators, though some of that criticism is misplaced. Particularly before the introduction of CGT, it was an unfortunate rule from the Commissioner’s point of view.

Where the receipt is a lump sum which includes unliquidated damages, the question is whether, from the matrix of surrounding facts, there is any basis for apportionment.

Sometimes it is advantageous to the taxpayer if the damages can be apportioned. In 1979, Pincus QC (as he then was) wrote that the difficulty about apportionment provides an incentive to litigants to settle their differences. Since the introduction of CGT, that statement requires qualification.

In the first place, the Commissioner will treat a receipt which cannot be dissected into components of income and capital as capital proceeds, this in some cases leading to a worse result for the taxpayer than if the receipt were apportionable.

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53 See FCT v Dixon (1953) 86 CLR 540, 556; FCT v Harris 80 ATC 4238, 4247 to 4248 per Fisher J.
54 See, eg, FCT v CSR (2000) 104 FCR 44.
55 Ibid.
56 A more extensive analysis of the caselaw on this subject is contained in ‘Taxation of Compensatory Payments and Judgments’ by Pincus QC (as he then was), (1979) 53 ALJ 365.
57 It would appear that compensation can be treated as having been paid only for claims which are at least arguable: see Allsop v FCT (1965) 113 CLR 341, 352 cf 351.
58 See McLaurin v FCT (1961) 104 CLR 381; Allsop v FCT (1965) 113 CLR 341; Sommer v FCT [2002] ATC 4815. This principle is not to be confused with various statutory provisions for apportionment, which may apply to various kinds of statutory income.
59 See FCT v CSR (2000) 104 FCR 44; Sommer v FCT, supra; Case W 40 89 ATC 399; Easy v FCT (1941) 6 ATD 101.
60 See Section below on Taxation of damages which are capital, Guidelines 4 and 5.
Secondly, in general, the Commissioner will not allow you to claim the benefit of an exemption if it could apply to part only of an award of damages, but the damages cannot relevantly be apportioned. In such cases, obviously, it may be in the plaintiff’s interests that the court order or deed of settlement apportion the damages so that there is an entitlement to the exemption from taxation. This is likely to be of potential benefit to both parties, so it should not be difficult to get the other side to agree.

In other cases, if for example, part of the damages consist of an amount to which a higher rate of tax would apply if it were segregated, it may be better if the amount is not apportionable. This result may be achieved, eg, because the defendant merely makes an ‘all in’ offer to settle a claim both for income and capital losses which the plaintiff accepts. One has always to be aware of the looming presence of Pt IVA, however. It may be advantageous to accept an unapportionable sum because as such it will be subject to a lower rate of tax than would otherwise be the case.

If the receipt is assessable as net capital gains rather than as ordinary income, different rules apply. Under s116-40, if you receive a payment in connection with a transaction that relates to more than one CGT event, or one CGT event and something else, the capital proceeds must be reasonably apportioned.\(^{61}\)

5.4 Costs

The proceeds of an order for costs, where not ordinary income, may be assessable under Subdiv 20-A of Pt 2-1 of the ITAA97 as the assessable recoupment of a deductible expense.

5.5 Interest

Post-judgment interest is in the nature of interest and is derived as ordinary income.\(^{62}\) Post-judgment interest received on damages for personal injuries is, however, subject to certain conditions, exempt income.\(^{63}\)

Pre-judgment interest can presents problems of characterization. It is not taxable as ordinary income if awarded under the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) or Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 on unliquidated damages that are capital, such as damages for loss of earning capacity.\(^{64}\) It is regarded as being part of those damages and hence capital. The reasoning which leads to this result is contrary to the English authorities, which hold that pre-judgment interest under comparable statutory provisions, is in the nature of interest.\(^{65}\)

Interest is ordinary income where it is compensation for lost earnings, such as where, had the plaintiff not suffered damages, he would have earned the interest awarded.\(^{66}\)

But in many cases and arguably in all cases, this will not be the purpose of an award of pre-judgment interest pursuant to statute\(^{67}\) and depending on the circumstances it may or may not be the purpose of an award at common law.\(^{68}\)

Interest is also ordinary income if, like post-judgment interest it is payable on a sum, which, in respect of the period over which it is computed, was ascertainable and due.\(^{69}\) In such cases, it may be or be analogous to the product of a principal sum, and as such, analogous to the fruit of the tree.

So-called interest is not always in the nature of interest.\(^{70}\) For example, the Commissioner says that whether a part of compensation is in the nature of interest is a question of fact,\(^{71}\) and that penalty interest paid for the premature repayment of a loan is not in the nature of interest and is a capital sum.\(^{72}\)

\(^{61}\) As to apportionment of the cost base, see s112-30.
\(^{62}\) See Whitaker v FCT (1998) 98 ATC 4285.
\(^{63}\) See s51-55.
\(^{64}\) See Whitaker v FCT (1998) 98 ATC 4285.
\(^{66}\) See Federal Wharf Co v DFCT (1930) 44 CLR 24. See also, FCT v Blake 84 ATC 4661 and cf FCT v Harris 80 ATC 4238.
\(^{67}\) See Haines v Bendall (1991) 172 CLR 60, 66.
\(^{68}\) See Hungerfords v Walker (1988) 171 CLR 125, 152.
\(^{69}\) See Whitaker’s case above and Northumberland Development Co Pty Ltd v FCT 95 ATC 4483.
\(^{70}\) Ibid.
\(^{71}\) See TR95/35 at para 246.
\(^{72}\) See TR93/7.
5.6 Taxation of damages under CGT provisions

It is important to remember that a capital gain as defined in ITAA97 can be reduced or disregarded under the anti-overlap provisions in Subdiv 118-A (General exemptions.)

There have been a few cases, not always easy to reconcile, on the application of the CGT provisions to receipts of damages and compensation, and on what adjustments (if any) to the amount of an award are called for in consequence.73 In addition, the Commissioner has published a number of public rulings on the taxation of damages under the CGT provisions; namely, TR 95/35 (capital gains: treatment of compensation receipts), TR 97/3 (capital gains: compensation received by landowners from public authorities), TR 99/19 (capital gains: treatment of forfeited deposits, instalments and damages), and TR 94/29 (CGT consequences of a contract for the sale of land falling through.) These are binding on the Commissioner until withdrawn.74 They are not binding on taxpayers. From the rulings, it is possible to deduce a number of guidelines as to how the Commissioner will apply the CGT provisions to receipts of damages and compensation of various kinds, and what adjustments (if any) to the amount of damages or compensation may be called for in consequence.

The following are the main general rules or guidelines.

Rule: personal wrongs

A capital gain you make from a CGT event relating directly to compensation or damages you receive for any wrong or injury you suffer in your occupation, or for any wrong, injury or illness you or your relative suffers personally, is disregarded.75 The Commissioner interprets illness as including psychological damage or mental injury.76 He has ruled that ‘you’ is limited to natural persons, and that ‘wrong’ covers defamation, breach of privacy, sexual harassment, professional negligence of a solicitor in failing to institute a personal injury claim, unlawful discrimination and wrongful dismissal.77 In some of these cases, the plaintiff can take a tax exempt annuity (called a personal injury annuity) rather than a lump sum by way of compensation.78

It follows from the rule that the capital gain is disregarded, that CGT on the damages will be reduced to the extent to which the damages can be apportioned to damages received for wrong, injury or illness within the section. For examples, see Egs 14 to 17 of TR95/35. Whether this would call for a taxation adjustment to be made to the amount of damages, would depend on the circumstances.

Obviously, great care is required to ensure that the order or judgment for damages or the settlement deed or agreement are in such terms as to enable such apportionment as will allow the plaintiff to claim the benefit of the exemption.

Guideline 1: where disposal of underlying asset

The Commissioner treats79 the receipt of damages for the disposal of an asset by the plaintiff as capital proceeds. The damages are treated as capital proceeds of the disposal albeit in a less direct sense than payment of the purchase price. This approach is called the underlying asset or look through approach.80 It is consistent with the reasoning in FCT v Guy.81 Depending on the circumstances, the relevant CGT event82 may be A1 (disposal of a CGT asset), or C1 (loss or destruction of a CGT asset), in which case there may be a roll-over of the capital gain so that it is reduced or disregarded.83

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73 See below.
74 See TR 92/1 and Sch1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953.
75 See s118-37(1).
76 See Draft Tax Ruling (DTR) 1999/D1.
77 See TR 95/35.
78 See Div 54 of the ITAA97.
79 See TR 95/35.
80 Ibid. The Commissioner justifies this approach by reference, inter alia, to s118-30 (insurance policies) and Subdiv 124-B: see TR 95/35 [70ff] and Carborundum Realty Pty Ltd v RAIA Archicentre Pty Ltd (1993) 25 ATR 192.
81 96 ATC 4520, 4531 (Full Federal Court.) Cf Brooks & Anor v FCT 2000 ATC 4362 (FFC), not following Guy’s case on one, but not this point.
82 As to which, see s104-5.
83 See, eg, Subdiv 124-B of the ITAA97.
Where this guideline applies, a capital gain made from the disposal of a taxpayer’s main residence or car may be exempt, and a capital gain is generally disregarded where the plaintiff acquired the asset before 20 September 1985.

This guideline applies to such cases as a plaintiff suing his agent for causing the plaintiff to sell an asset for less than it was worth, and compensation paid for a compulsory acquisition.

Without particular facts, it is difficult, indeed dangerous to generalize about the need for tax adjustments in a particular category of case. Nevertheless, it seems safe to say that there should be no cause for making an adjustment to the damages on account of CGT, where the proceeds lead to the same CGT consequences whether paid as purchase moneys or as damages. So far as I can tell, in many, if not all cases, this will be the position.

Guideline 2: where underlying asset not disposed of but permanently damaged or reduced in value

If there is no disposal of an underlying post CGT asset at the time of receipt of the damages, but the damages are awarded for its being permanently damaged or reduced in value, the Commissioner treats the receipt of damages as a recoupment of expenditure made on the asset, thus reducing its cost base.

It is as if the cost which the plaintiff has recouped was never incurred; hence, for example, only the adjusted cost base can be subject to indexation. There are no CGT consequences until the underlying asset is disposed of, or is the subject of some other CGT event; moreover, to the extent that the damages exceed (if at all) the unindexed cost base of the underlying asset, there are no CGT consequences.

Examples are as follows: compensation for damage caused to the plaintiff’s building by the defendant’s negligent operation of machinery, compensation for permanent damage caused to the plaintiff’s goodwill by reason of defamation by the defendant.

The recoupment has to be a recoupment of expenditure. A recoupment includes an indemnity. According to the Commissioner, where a plaintiff gets damages for the actual or anticipated cost of repairing permanent damage to an underlying asset, but the plaintiff chooses not to incur the expenditure on the underlying asset for which he has been compensated, there is no recoupment, and the right to seek compensation is the most relevant asset in respect of which the damages have been received.

In most, if not all of these types of cases, it seems likely that a tax adjustment would not be warranted, except in certain circumstances where the damages were in excess of the unindexed cost base of the underlying asset. Where as a result of the damage caused to the underlying asset it is later sold for less than it otherwise would have been, the shortfall in the capital proceeds may correspond with the reduction in the cost base that is due to the recoupment. If the damages pay for repairs so that there is no shortfall in capital proceeds, then the plaintiff will be in the same position he would have been in had he not suffered the loss.

Guideline 3: the plaintiff receives damages for paying an excessive price for an asset

In this case, the Commissioner treats the damages as being a recoupment of the cost base, as under the last preceding guideline. An example of this case, would be a purchaser receiving such damages by

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84 See s118-5 and Subdiv 118-B and Guy’s case, supra.
85 See ss104-10(5) (special rule for leases) and s104-20(4), but subject to special requirements where corporate taxpayers, see eg, Div 165 and generally, TR 95/35.
86 See, as an example, the facts in Provan v HCL Real Estate 92 ATC 4644.
87 See TR 95/35, but note also the roll-over provisions in Subdiv 124-B of the ITAA97.
89 See TR95/35 and Eg 6 therein.
90 See TR 95/35 at [130].
91 See TR 95/35.
92 See TR 95/35, Eg 6.
93 As to what is a recoupment, see s20-25.
94 See ss110-45(3) and 110-55(6).
95 See s20-25.
96 See TR 95/35 at [135 to 137]. Query whether this needs to be re-examined in light of the definition of ‘recoupment’ in the ITAA97 referred to above. The ruling analyses the CGT provisions in the ITAA36, which have been replaced by the CGT provisions referred to above.
97 If the cost of the repairs is deductible, then their recoupment will in general be assessable.
reason of his agent’s having colluded with the vendor, or having failed to detect defects in the property, as in Carborundum Realty Pty Ltd v RAIA Archicentre Pty Ltd.98 Another example is furnished by the facts in Duke Group (in liq) v Pilmer99 (excessive price paid for shares.) See also Egs 5, 20 and 24 in TR 95/35.

Assume A paid $x too much for an asset and gets damages of $x. A sells the asset. Assume further had A not paid $x, his profit on sale (ignoring the damages) would have been greater by $x. In such a case, because the capital gain is the same as it would have been if A had not paid $x, no taxation adjustment in assessing the damages is called for.

Guideline 4: where no underlying asset of relevance

This is different from the previous cases discussed. In this category of case, the Commissioner treats damages as being capital proceeds for the release, discharge or satisfaction of the cause of action within the meaning of CGT event C2.100 The Commissioner says that the relevant causes of action are acquired at the time of the first actionable wrong.101

There are significant limitations on the elements of the cost base of the cause of action.102 Although in Namol Pty Ltd v AW Baulderstone Pty Ltd,103 the Court said that loss suffered could be considered as being part of the cost base, in the opinion of the writer, it is difficult to see any warrant for that conclusion in the cost base provisions themselves, and it is unlikely that the Commissioner would accept this view. Nevertheless, the Commissioner says that expenditure incurred by a plaintiff and claimed as a head of damages, are treated as part of the cost base, and likewise, compensation paid by a plaintiff for which he claims an indemnity from his insurer, is part of the cost base of the claim to be indemnified by the insurer.104 The Commissioner also treats the plaintiff’s legal fees and charges as being part of the cost base.105

There is some support in the authorities for treating the cause of action as the relevant asset in a wider category of cases than that to which it is applied by the Commissioner.106 Assuming the treatment has the more limited application, the following examples of cases where it would apply may be given: the plaintiff vendor receives damages by reason that a contract for the sale of land has fallen through in circumstances where there is no associated disposal of the land;107 the plaintiff receives damages for breach of a covenant not to compete with the plaintiff’s business.108

In such cases, as in Duke’s case109 and Egs 8, 9 and 11 of TR 95/31, there may be a need for a taxation adjustment to be made when assessing damages.

It is to be noted that, although an unsatisfied judgment could constitute capital proceeds, depending on the circumstances, the relevant capital proceeds could be nil. This would be so if the judgment were worthless,110 and the non-receipt rule set forth in s116-45 applied.

Guideline 5: where damages relate or compensation relates to a number of different heads and can’t be apportioned

Suppose, for example, that the damages relate both to income and to capital. Suppose another case, where the asset underlying part of the damages is an asset other than the cause of action, but there is no asset underlying the remainder of the damages other than the cause of action. Suppose, in each case, that the damages cannot be apportioned, and that they are not covered by an exemption, such as described above.

9931 ACSR 213.
100 See s104-25(1) and Hepples v FCT (1991) 173 CLR 492 and see TR 95/35.
101 See TR 95/35.
102 See s110-25(1) to (3).
104 See TR 95/35.
105 Ibid. See also [37.]
106 See, eg, Rabelais Pty Ltd v Cameron (1995) 95 ATC 4552.
107 See ibid; Zim Properties v Procter [1985] 58 TC 371; TR 94/29; TR 95/35, Egs 8 and 9; TR 99/19. As to forfeiture of deposits, see CGT event H1 in s104-5 and TR 94/21.
108 See, eg, Tuit v Exelby 93 ATC 4293.
109 Supra.
110 See Div 116.
In this category of case,\textsuperscript{111} as in the last, the Commissioner treats damages as being capital proceeds for the release, discharge or satisfaction of the cause of action within the meaning of CGT event C2.\textsuperscript{112}

In this category of case, there may well be grounds for making a tax adjustment to the damages.

\textit{Guideline 6: cases which do not fall into any of the abovementioned categories}

In such cases, the relevant CGT event may be D1 or if not D1, H2. These are events of last resort.\textsuperscript{113} Depending on the circumstances, the Commissioner might treat the following as such cases: an \textit{ex gratia} payment of compensation;\textsuperscript{114} compensation received for an undertaking not to compete; an award of punitive damages.\textsuperscript{115}

\textit{Guideline 7: tax adjustments to damages}

A tax adjustment occurs where damages are adjusted up or down to take account of taxation. (See below.) The Commissioner treats these in the same way as the basic award of damages or compensation. The tax adjustment may take the form of an indemnity. An indemnity is itself a CGT asset. The capital proceeds will be the market value of the indemnity. \textsuperscript{116}

\textit{Guideline 8: costs and recovery of costs}

The Commissioner may treat costs as part of the relevant cost base.\textsuperscript{117} Hence, he may treat the recovery of costs as a recoupment of that part of the cost base.\textsuperscript{118}

5.7 \textbf{Deductibility of compensation and damages payments}

There are provisions, such as in s25-50 of the ITAA97 and Subdiv3AA of Pt III of the ITAA36 which allow you to deduct specific types of payments; but, in this paper I make only a few comments about deductibility under Div 8 of the ITAA97 (deductions) and the black hole expenditure provisions.

The general tests for determining whether a loss or outgoing falls within s8-1 are expounded in numerous cases.\textsuperscript{119}

It is to be noted that s8-1 (general deductions), unlike s6-5 (ordinary income) of the ITAA97 specifically provides for apportionment (‘to the extent that’), so the limitations on apportioning parts of composite sums to income, referred to above, do not apply.\textsuperscript{120}

Losses and outgoings of capital or of a capital nature are not deductible under Div 8. As to the distinction between losses and outgoings of revenue on the one hand and capital on the other, the test is that set out in \textit{Sun Newspapers Ltd v FCT}\textsuperscript{21} as elucidated by later authorities. A payment made for a restrictive covenant, for example, is generally, but not necessarily, made on capital account.\textsuperscript{122} It is also important to note that the fact a receipt is properly characterised as ordinary income does not mean that its payment is on capital account, although it may assist in reaching that conclusion.\textsuperscript{123} In view of the broadening of the ‘black hole’ expenditure provisions (see below), the distinction between losses and outgoings of capital on the one hand and revenue on the other has less importance in many cases than it once had.

\textsuperscript{111} Instances are given in Egs 12 and 13 in TR 95/35.
\textsuperscript{112} See TR 95/35, [18].
\textsuperscript{113} See ss102-25, 104-35(5) and 104-155(5).
\textsuperscript{114} See Eg 10 in TR 95/35.
\textsuperscript{115} See Eg 7 in TR 95/35.
\textsuperscript{116} See TR 95/35, [27].
\textsuperscript{117} See TR 95/35, Eg 3 and TR 94/29, [63]. See also [28] above.
\textsuperscript{118} See TR 95/35, Eg 4. As to the recoupment provisions, see above.
\textsuperscript{119} See such cases as \textit{John Fairfax and Sons Pty Ltd v FCT} (1959) 101 CLR 30; \textit{Peyton v FCT} (1963) 109 CLR 315; \textit{FCT v Smith} 81 ATC 4144; \textit{Magna Alloys & Research Pty Ltd v FCT} 80 ATC 4542, and more recently, \textit{ANZ v FCT} 94 ATC 4026; \textit{WD & HO Wills (Australia) Pty Ltd v FCT} 96 ATC 4223; \textit{Sweetman v CIR (Fijii)} 96 ATC 5107; \textit{Cape Flattery Silica Mines Pty Ltd v FCT} 97 ATC 4552.
\textsuperscript{120} See \textit{Ronpibon Tin N.L. v FCT} (1949) 113 CLR 47.
\textsuperscript{121} See \textit{Dickenson v FCT} 98 CLR 460; \textit{Buckley & Young Ltd v CIR (NZ)} 78 ATC 6019; \textit{Riba Foods Pty Ltd v FCT} 90 ATC 4986.
\textsuperscript{122} See \textit{Dickenson v FCT} 98 CLR 460; \textit{Buckley & Young Ltd v CIR (NZ)} 78 ATC 6019; \textit{Riba Foods Pty Ltd v FCT} 90 ATC 4986.
5.7.1 **Deductibility of costs**

The principles described in 3.7 above apply.\(^\text{124}\)

5.7.2 **Black hole expenditure: 5 year write off**

Under ITAA97, s40-880, business capital expenses (subject to certain important exceptions) are deductible over 5 years. These could include damages or compensation payments of a capital nature.

If expenditure is not deductible, it may be capable of forming part of the cost base of a CGT asset under Div110 of Pt3-1 of the ITAA97.

6 **GST**

Under s9-10 of the GST Act,\(^\text{125}\) a supply is any form of supply whatsoever including a creation, grant, transfer, assignment or surrender of any right and an entry into or release from an obligation, but generally does not include a supply of money: s9-15. A payment of damages or compensation may be considered for a taxable supply (on which GST is payable)\(^\text{126}\) and if so, the payer may thereby make a creditable acquisition.\(^\text{127}\)

Div19 of Pt2-4 of the Act provides for increasing and decreasing adjustments to GST amounts and input tax credit amounts. These arise because of adjustment events, such as a change in the consideration for a supply or acquisition.\(^\text{128}\)

There are special rules relating to insurance and claims settled under insurance policies.\(^\text{129}\)

GST\(\text{TR2001/4}\) sets out the Commissioner’s treatment of the GST consequences of court orders and out-of-court settlements. The ruling says that a court, in giving judgment, does not make a supply for GST purposes,\(^\text{130}\) that the payment, in money, of a judgment debt will not itself be a supply for GST purposes,\(^\text{131}\) and that the extinguishment of a judgment debt by its payment does not constitute a supply by the judgment creditor for GST purposes.\(^\text{132}\)

As to out-of-court settlements, the ruling says\(^\text{133}\) that although releases and the like, are supplies, payments under the settlement are not treated as consideration for that supply, except where there is overwhelming evidence that the claim which is the subject of the dispute is so lacking in substance that the payment could only have been made for the discontinuance supply.\(^\text{134}\)

The ruling says that a payment made under a court order made wholly in respect of a claim for damages is not consideration for a supply,\(^\text{135}\) and that a payment made under an out-of-court settlement to resolve such a claim, where there is no earlier or current supply\(^\text{136}\) will not be consideration for a supply.\(^\text{137}\) A current supply, to be contrasted with a discontinuance supply, is a new supply created by a settlement or judgment, such as a vesting order.\(^\text{138}\)

The ruling states that the payment of court ordered costs or costs negotiated in a settlement\(^\text{139}\) will not be consideration for an earlier or current supply, and that the costs order or settled amount should take account of any entitlement to an input tax credit of the parties to the original supply.\(^\text{140}\)

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\(^{124}\) See *Hallstroms Pty Ltd v FCT* (1946) 72 CLR 634, 647; *Magna Alloys & Research Pty Ltd v FCT* 78 ATC 4575; *Putnin v FCT* 91 ATC 4097; *Creer v FCT* 94 ATC 4454; *Elberg v FCT* 98 ATC 4454; *Davies v FCT* 2005 ATC 2331.


\(^{126}\) See s7-1 of the GST Act.

\(^{127}\) See Div 11 thereof. See also s78-110 (insurance) and Div 99 for forfeiture of deposits.

\(^{128}\) See s19-1.

\(^{129}\) See Div78.

\(^{130}\) See para60.

\(^{131}\) See para61.

\(^{132}\) See para67.

\(^{133}\) See paras 54 and 106 to 109.

\(^{134}\) An example would be a claim with merely a ‘nuisance’ value.

\(^{135}\) See para110.

\(^{136}\) As to which, see paras45 to 49.

\(^{137}\) See para111.

\(^{138}\) See paras 42 to 70.

\(^{139}\) The ruling says, ‘in the circumstances described.’
The ruling also deals with questions of apportionment.\(^\text{141}\)

Although the effect of the ruling is to place restrictions on the application of GST to awards of damages and settlements, it is still necessary for parties to litigation or settlements to consider whether or not there will or may be an adverse adjustment or liability to GST, and if so, to take it into account.

In some cases (such cases will, I think be rare), it will be appropriate to adjust the amount of compensation on account of GST (eg, if the liability to GST or adverse adjustment is part of the loss being compensated). In many cases, however, but for the occasion causing the loss, the GST in question would have been payable in any case. In cases (also likely to be rare) where there is uncertainty, it may be advisable to include a provision for adjustment of the amount of compensation, such as a ‘gross up’ clause. Account should be taken of input tax credits, and where, had the loss not occurred, GST would have been payable, that amount of GST should be deducted from the damages or compensation if they themselves are not consideration for a supply. This is an application of the Gourley principle and could apply where, for example, there is no current or earlier supply for which the compensation is paid, but the compensation is based on the value of property, turnover, or of revenue on the hypothesis of its being a supply, or is to be adjusted in accordance with the consumer price index.

If additional GST is payable, you may want to provide that the compensation is payable before the GST has to be paid.

GSTD2003/1 sets out the Commissioner’s GST treatment of pre and post-judgment interest.

GSTR2003/6 deals with GST and relationship breakdowns.

7 STATE TAXES

Of course, in cases where they may apply, it is important also to consider the incidence of State taxes on settlements and the transactions to which they or some order may give rise. What has been said generally about taxation adjustments applies here as well.

18 March, 2008

Michael Hines is a member of the Victorian Bar Professional Standards Scheme approved under Professional Standards Legislation. His liability is limited under that Scheme. A copy of the Scheme will be supplied on request.

\(^{140}\) See para149.

\(^{141}\) As does GSTR2001/8.